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1. Introduction 
Language planning means slightly different things to different 
writers as clearly shown by Karam (1974). However, most people 
would agree with Fishman (1974) that the generally accepted 
components of language planning are: policy formulation, codifica-
tion, elaboration, implementation and evaluation. 
In this paper, language planning is considered in the matrix 
of overall national 1 (governmental) planning. The language planning 
processes mentioned above are, for the purposes of this paper, 
summarized under two headings--policy formulation and language 
engineering. Policy formulation is concerned with the initial 
stage of language planning, and is characterized by Fishman et al. 
(1971) as "the functional allocation of codes within a speech 
community." The term "language engineering" is used in this paper 
to cover'those aspects of language planning that entail deliberate 
and planned attempts to change language structure and behavior. 
The processes covered by language engineering are: codification, 
elaboration, and implementation. Evaluation, as Rubin (1971) has 
shown, interpenetrates all the processes, and is necessary at 
every stage of language planning. 
The approach adopted in this paper is functional in two 
senses. In the first place, language planning is viewed as 
decision making involving the determination and assignment of 
desired functions to the various language varieties within a given 
country, and the planned measures to get these decisions accepted 
by the target population. Secondly, the intrinsic functions of 
language (those functions possessed to some degree by every 
natural human language) serve as the basis for policy-making and 
language engineering decisions. 
2. Language planning and Sub-Saharan Africa 
It was noted in the preceding section that the two major 
processes involved in language planning are policy formulation 
and language engineering. Language engineering is particularly 
relevant in situations where policy decisions have already been 
taken. In Africa, however, only a handful of countries have taken 
basic language decisions, such as the choice of a national language. 
Appendices A and B show that for the vast majority of African 
countries, language planning will have to be at the level of policy 
formulation. Even in countries where some policy decisions have 
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been taken, there is still no clear allocation of domains of usage 
to the national language2 vis-a-vis the other indigenous languages, 
and the exoglossic or official language. In two countries--
Central African Republic and Togo--the national language is 
nominally symbolic, and has not been assigned any significant 
function. Even in Tanzania, the African country with the most 
vigorous implementation policy, there is still no consensus as to 
the desired functions to be performed by Swahili. Clearly then, 
the aspect of language planning most relevant to Sub-Saharan 
Africa is policy formulation. Appendix A shows that, apart from 
the almost homogeneous nation-states of Lesotho, Botswana, Burundi, 
Rwanda and Somalia, all African countries are linguistically 
heterogeneous, with an average of fifteen or more language varieties. 
Policy formulation in these countries will not be an easy task, so 
the rest of this paper is devoted to this important problem. 
3. Policy formulation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A functional approach 
It is postulated in this paper that the intrinsic functions 
of language can serve as a basis for language policy decisions. 
Most linguists would agree that a language performs at least two 
functions--the expressive and the communicative--for those people 
for whom it is their native variety. There is also general agree-
ment that language is frequently a symbol of solidarity and thus 
serves, in many instances, a unifying 3 function. By the same token, 
language often arouses "primordial"4 sentiments and loyalties; it 
is frequently an outward symbol of ethnic cleavages and, in this 
sense, serves a separatist function. 
The four functions mentioned above are given from the point 
of view of the native speaker of a language. However, language 
planning usually entails a change in the linguistic behavior of 
the target community, sometimes requiring the acquisition by some 
people of new speech varieties in addition to, or in place of 
their native speech patterns. Old speech habits are hard to change, 
and studies have shown that most people learn new languages only 
if these are perceived as useful in personal advancement, or as 
necessary for participation in a culturally or economically richer 
life. In short, for a language to be readily learned, it must 
serve for the learner a participatory function. 
In the theory proposed in this paper, adequate policy 
formulation must take into account all the five functions mentioned 
above. In many situations, it would be impossible to find a single 
language variety that could fulfill all the functions. In such 
instances, a bilingual or multilingual policy of language use 
would be in order. The implications of this functional approach 
for policy formulation in Sub-Saharan Africa are discussed below. 
3.1. Expressive function. Anthropological linguists point out 
that language is an embodiment of a people's culture and is 
expressive of their experiences and world view. In the African 
context, an exoglossic 5 language cannot, unmodified, capture those 
experiences that are peculiarly African. The expressive function, 
so defined, .is very often the basis for advocators of "authenticity" 
39  
in policy formulation. As reported by Whiteley (1974') , protagonists 
for the adoption of Akan in Ghana, during debates over the national 
issue, brought to the fore this inability of an exoglossic language 
to serve the expressive function for Africans. 
In the frame of reference used here, one possible way of 
satisfying the expressive function is to extend the domains of 
usage of one of the indigenous languages, so that it eventually 
replaces, and serves the functions of, all the other native varieties 
within the target conununity. Tanzania, with its "hard sell" program 
of Swahili, seems to have adopted this approach. 
Another possible solution is to give some form of recognition 
to all the indigenous language varieties in a given conununity; the 
vernaculars could, for instance, be used as mediums of instruction 
at the lower levels of education. Political and economic factors 
may, however, militate against this approach. Even if it is deemed 
politically and educationally expedient to recognize all the 
indigenous languages, economic factors may force a contrary decision. 
How economically feasible would it be, for instance, for a country 
like the Central African Republic, with a population of about 11/2 
million, to embark on training teachers and producing educational 
materials for the thirty-five language varieties in the country? 
It is significant to note that it is in countries li~e Nigeria , 
Zaire, and Kenya, which have numerically important languages, that 
a measure of recognition has been given to the indigenous languages. 
Economic, demographic, and political factors can thus limit the 
role of the expressive function in policy formulation. 
3.2. The conununicative function. Although all human languages 
serve the conununicative function, they differ from one another in 
conununicative adequacy as judged by their level of modernization. 
Only well "developed" languages in the Fergusonian sense can thus 
adequately fulfill the conununicative function. Since no African 
language is fully modernized in the sense described above (Amharic 
and Swahili are in the process of modernizing), the exoglossic 
language would be favored if the conununicative function is given 
predominance. This may account for the retention by independent 
African countries of exoglossic languages (usually French or 
English) for official or co-official functions. In Ethiopia, the 
fact that Tigrinya is relatively "modern" may account for its 
partial recognition, whereas the numerically superior but unstand-
ardized Gallinya has absolutely no official recognition. 
Taking the conununicative function into account in policy 
formulation does not necessarily mean giving recognition to an 
already modernized language. If other f actors are f avorable, an 
indigenous language could be chosen, as in Kenya and Tanzania, 
with a view to eventually modernizing it. Such modernization 
usually involves lexical and stylistic elaboration and, sometimes, 
requires an enormous outla¥ in money, time, equipment and personnel. 
The inunediate economic and practical obstacles presented by any 
such wholesale modernization program cannot be underestimated. 
This may account, in part, for the preference by the majority of 
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African countries for the retention of exoglossic languages for 
official and wider-communication purposes. However, the ultimate 
question for policy formulators is whether language policies should 
be based on immediate utility and convenience, or whether deeper-
based cultural issues should be taken into consideration. 
3.3. The unifying function. It has sometimes been assumed that 
European languages can serve as catalysts for unity in African 
countries. This can only be so if unity is limited to the super-
ficial level of practical communication. Beyond this level, 
language cannot, of itself, unite people of disparate and varying 
backgrounds. How, for instance, does the possession of a common 
language unite a Gabonese and, say, a French Canadian? 
It must be pointed out that the fact that an exoglossic 
language cannot serve the unifying function in Africa does not 
necessarily mean that any endogl6ssic language can perform this 
function. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) have convincingly argued 
that ethnicity is the most compelling basis for group cohesion. 
Where language coincides with ethnicity, as in the nation-states 
of Europe such as Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Greece, and Iceland, 
language can certainly fulfill a unifying function. In Africa, 
language can serve a unifying function in the ethnically and 
linguistically homogeneous nations of Lesotho and Somali, and 
possibly in Botswana. 
On the other hand, language cannot serve a unifying function 
in countries where ethnicity and language do not coincide. However, 
the possession of the same language by members of different ethnic 
groups within a community neutralizes the potential use of language 
for divisive purposes by unscrupulous political entrepreneurs. 
Thus, even though the common use of English by the English, Irish, 
Scots, and Welsh has not completely removed the animosities between 
the four groups, language is no longer a salient political issue. 
Similarly, in Africa, the fact that the Hutus and the Tutsis share 
a common language--Rundi in Burundi, and Rwanda in Rwanda--has 
not eliminated their animosities, but at least language cannot be 
used as an additional divisive force. 
The remaining countries of Africa are, as indicated in 
Appendix A, linguistically as well as ethnically heterogeneous. 
Language cannot, as already noted, perform a unifying function in 
these countries, so unity must be sought at other levels. Language 
planning is, however, still relevant here with respect to the 
unifying function. Although language is at present politically 
unimportant in Africa, its potential divisive saliency cannot be 
ignored by policy formulators. The experience of Belgium, where 
language formerly posed no problem, shows that language can 
gradually gain political saliency with increasing ethnic assertion 
and corresponding literacy in the ethnic language. Policy 
formulators would, therefore, have to take steps to neutralize 
the potential divisive saliency of the various indigenous languages. 
Two courses are possible--the assimilative approach, and the 
laissez-faire approach. France and England, where minority language 
varieties were assimilated into French and English respectively, 
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are good examples of the assimilative approach. It must be pointed 
out that the assimilative approach works best in totalitarian 
regimes, such as absolute monarchies. However, the success of 
Tanzania's Swahili implementation program suggests that it may also 
work well in relatively democratic societies. 
Switzerland is the example, par excellence, of the Zaisse2-faire 
approach. In this approach, the primordial or natural loyalties 
represented by language and ethnicity are not disturbed. They are 
rather accepted and taken into consideration in political organi-
zation, leading, in many instances, to the creation of linguisti-
cally-defined political units. 
Both approaches present problems in the African context. The 
integrative approach would have to deal with the problem of choosing 
an acceptable national language, and the Zaisse2-faire approach 
would have to reconcile the requirement for linguistically-based 
political units with the viability of mini-units based on language 
varieties with a small number of native speakers, as in the Sudan, 
Gabon, and Zambia. These problems are tackled in a subsequent section. 
3.4. Separatist function. Although it was noted above that language 
is often the outward symbol of ethnic cleavages, it must be pointed 
out that there are several instances where language does not serve 
a separatist function. The Scotsman who shares English with other 
ethnic groups in Great Britain, cannot use language as a symbol 
of ethnic uniqueness, 6 but must rely on other things such as dress, 
dance, etc., to perform this function. The situation is different 
in other European countries. Emphasis on the separatist function 
led, for instance, to the emergence of two standard languages--
German and Dutch--from mutually intelligible dialects. In the same 
way, the emergence of standard Flemish can be regarded as symbolizing 
Flemish assertion of independence and separation from the neighboring 
Dutch. 
Turning to Africa, only languages that do not extend beyond one 
country can fulfill the separatist function at the national level. 
Here, it must be pointed out that the separatist function is in 
conflict with the participatory function, and that policy formulators 
must balance separatist and participatory tendencies. 
In linguistically homogeneous countries, such as Botswana, 
Burundi, Lesotho, Rwanda, and Somali, where the principal language 
varieties are mainly confined to one nation, language can serve 
a separatist function. Amharic can also potentially play this role 
in Ethiopia if and when Amharic becomes accepted throughout the 
country. 
For the heterogeneous African countries, language serves a 
separatist function only at the ethnic level. Emphasis on the 
separatist function of language at the national level automatically 
implies the adoption of the assimilative approach to language policy. 
Such a policy emphatically rules out the adoption of an exoglossic 
language, but it also rules out some indigenous African languages 
of wider communication, such as Swahili and Hausa, which are not 
limited to the confines of any one country. 
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The arbitrary nature of national boundaries in Africa has 
often been pointed out. Some people, notably Sekou Toure of 
Guinea, and the late Nkrumah of Ghana, have argued that nationalism 
is not feasible in the African context, and that the only way to 
counter Africa's artibrary colonial boundaries is to opt for pan-
Africanism. In this way, it is argued, Africa can once more 
regain her "natural" boundaries. There are obviously many points 
for and against this view, and policy formulators would have to 
carefully balance the pros and the cons. They would have to 
decide whether nationalism as known in Europe is appropriate for 
Africa, or whether separation, if at all, should be sought at 
the continental or pan-African level. Their decision will be 
reflected in their choice of a national language. A vote for 
nationalism would be reflected in the choice of a nationally 
unique language. On the other hand, if pan-Africanism is preferred, 
a potentially pan-African language is favored. East African 
countries, notably Kenya and Tanzania, seem to have gone the pan-
African route in their choice of Swahili as the national language, 
but an analogous development does not seem possible in West Africa, 
due to the different political and sociological forces at work 
in that area. 
3.5, The participatory function. In contrast to the separatist 
function which is inward-looking, the participatory f'unction is 
outward-looking. As Garvin (1973) points out, it works in favor 
of modernized or "intellectualized"7 languages. Modernization, 
however, is not enough. English and French are regularly used in 
scientific reports by scholars in Poland, Holland, Czechoslovakia, 
etc.--countries that already possess highly standardized languages 
of their own. 
The importance of the participatory function cannot therefore be 
overemphasized. In homogeneous but sparsely populated countries such 
as Iceland, Finland, and Greece, the need for languages of wider 
communication has led to the general adoption of English, French, 
and, sometimes, German as second languages. In Africa, a country 
such as Ethiopia which was never colonized by a foreign power, 
has still found it necessary to use English for semi-official 
purposes. The de facto exoglossic language policies of most 
African countries may also be due, in part, to the high degree to 
which French and English possess the participatory function. 
The participatory f'unction requires of policy formulators 
that they order national priorities with respect to the people with 
whom association is desired. 8 When Turkey opted for participation 
in the European community rather than the Moslem world, it changed 
its language policy accordingly. In contrast to this, the desire 
by some African countries--notably Mauritania, Sudan, and Somalia--
to associate with the Moslem world, has led to their preference 
of Arabic over French, English, and Italian. 
In summary, the expressive, unifying and separatist functions 
require the recognition of endoglossic languages in policy 
formulation, while the communicative and participatory functions 
dictate the retention (for some time at least) of exoglossic 
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languages. A policy of "exendoglossism"--partial exoglossism and 
partial endoglossism--is therefore indicated for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. As for the domains of usage, the experience of Europe 
shows that other things being favorable (e.g. economic and 
demographic viability), any chosen national language could be 
used for legislative and administrative purposes, and as a medium 
of instructi~n up to and including the university. Due to the 
rather universal nature of science and technology, the exoglossic 
language could be used in the sciences, and the national language 
could be reserved for the humanities at the university level. 
The exoglossic language could also be used for international trade 
and foreign relations. As for the indigenous varieties not chosen 
as the national language, they could be used for transitional 
purposes at lower primary school levels of instruction. Whether 
the numerically more important languages are granted regional 
official status, and allowed to be developed for use up to the 
university level as in India, depends on whether the assimilative 
or laissez-faiPe approach is adopted. 
The exact form this basic model of "exendoglossism" takes 
would differ from country to country, depending on sociological, 
historical, demographic, and other variables. 
4. Variations on proposed model: Some significant variables in 
policy formulation 
The effect of religious variables on language choice in 
Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan has already been pointed out. 
The influence of demographic variables (numerical strength, 
presence or absence of homogeneity, etc.) on policy formulation 
has also been pointed out. Some other important variables are 
discussed in this section under three headings--societal structure, 
attitudes, and pressure to change. 
4.1. Societal structure. The effect of the demographic dimension 
of societal structure has been mentioned. In relatively linguis-
tically homogeneous countries like Botswana, Burundi, Lesotho, 
Rwanda, and Somalia, it may be possible to grant recognition to 
only one indigenous language. However, in Nigeria, Zaire, Uganda, 
Kenya, and Ghana--countries in which there are a number of numer-
ically significant languages, each with 1 million speakers or more--
it may be necessary to have regional official languages in addition 
to the national and exoglossic languages, 
At the political level, it should be pointed out that the 
approach to language planning outlined here is based on the 
assumption that there is some form of democracy or at least some 
free choice in the target communities. It does not apply in 
totalitarian regimes where policy formulators do not have to worry 
about the popularity of their decisions, but even here an under-
standing of the functions of language as they apply in language 
engineering, could lead to easier implementation. 
Also, language policies can differ depending on whether the 
political structure is characterized by minority domination, 
majority domination, or a competitive configuration. 9 If the 
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political structure is such that active rivalries and antagonisms 
exist, as was the case in Nigeria, Zaire, and Sierra Leone before 
the military take-overs, an acceptable language policy is more 
dififcult to arrive at. On the other hand, when there is a clear 
dominant group, policy decisions may be easier to make. 
The fact that power in Liberia is firmly entrenched in the 
hands of a minority English-speaking elite, may account for what 
Whiteley (1974) sees as Liberia'·s "unequivocal" opting for 
English. However, dominance does not necessarily ensure policy 
acceptance. The inability of the numerically and politically 
dominant Sinhalese to impose their language on the rest of the 
population in Ceylon, shows that dominance is not enough. The 
Ceylonese experience is paralleled in Africa by Sudan and 
Mauritania, where an attempt by the Arab rulers to impose Arabic 
on the rest of the population is meeting with resistance from 
minority language groups. 
In this approach, as already pointed out, the presence of 
democratic processes is assumed. Dominance does not ensure 
acceptance for a poorly formulated policy. Such a policy can only 
succee~ in a completely totalitarian regime, or in a situation 
where the dominated or minority groups are not politically 
mobilized. 
4.2. Attitudes . Prestige factors are important in policy formu-
lation. A prestigious language variety is more likely to be 
generally accepted than its non-prestigious counterpart. The 
fact that Pidgin English lacks prestige and, in fact, evokes 
negative attitudes in many West Africans, may account for the 
vehemence with which the idea of giving it some recognition has 
been rejected in Cameroun, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone--
countries in which the Pidgin plays the role of a lingua franca. 
On the other hand, Swahili's privileged position in East Africa, 
dating from the time of Arab imperialism, may account for its 
ready acceptance in two East African countries. 
One possible measure of prestige is the degree of popularity 
of any given language variety, as judged by the number of non-
native speakers that opt to learn it. In this sense, Luganda 
in Uganda, Gallinya in Ethiopia, and Kongo in Congo-Brazzaville, 
are not particularly popular languages since their use is limited 
mostly to speakers for whom they are native varieties. Their 
elevation to national status in their respective countries will 
probably not meet with as much opposition as will the languages 
mentioned above. 
The attitudes of the various ethnic groups in a community 
towards one another would also influence policy formulation. If 
active mutual animosities exist among several groups in any given 
country, a Zaissez-faiPe approach to policy formulation would be 
in order-other factors permitting. 
Policy formulators, to be effective, must be cognizant of 
the prevailing attitudes in their target population. Conducting 
attitude surveys10 is one way of determining the attitudinal 
climate of any given community. 
4.3. Pressure to change. Language planning, it has already been 
noted, usually entails a change in the linguistic behavior of the 
target population. A language policy that exerts more pressure 
to change on one or .more groups than on others, is likely to lead 
to problems. Simon (1969) states, for instance, that the language 
friction in Canada is caused, in part, by French Canadian resent-
ment for being exposed to greater pressure to learn English than 
there is for the English Canadian to learn French. The theoretical 
implication of this is that the most desirable policy is one that 
exerts equal pressure to change on all the component groups in a 
given country. 
In practice, such a policy is impossible; the best that can 
be done would be to formulate the policy in such a way that it 
exerts equal pressure on the vast majority of the target population. 
In terms of the choice of a national language, this could be 
achieved by adopting either the majority approach or the minority 
approach. In the majority approach, a numerically preponderant 
language is elevated to national status, as in Lesotho and 
Burundi. In the minority approach, the language elevated to 
national status is numerically a minority, as Judged by the 
number of speakers for whom it is their native variety. 
In view of the Indian, Ceylonese, and Sudanese experiences, 
it must be pointed out that the majority approach works best 
when the language chosen is clearly preponderant numerically 
(90% or more) as in the homogeneous African countries mentioned 
in this paper; another important prerequisite is that the numer-
ically minority language(s) not be prestigious. 
In Africa, the minority approach is represented by the 
language policies of Tanzania and Kenya where Swahili, the national 
language, is native to less than 5% of the population. The 
elevation of minority languages to national status has also been 
successfully done in Southeast Asia, as in the case of Bahasa 
Indonesia, and Tagalog in the Philippines. It must, of course, 
be pointed out that the three languages mentioned above--Swahili, 
Bahasa Indonesia, and Tagalog--had one advantage over their 
rivals. They were more standardized, and were, indeed, already 
used as lingua francas in their respective countries. 
Another contributing factor to the success of the minority 
approach is that it exerts equal pressure to learn on the majority 
of the population, while giving advantage (if any) to a numeri-
cally insignificant group. Since the majority approach cannot 
work in the majority of African countries because of their hetero-
geneity, one possible alternative is the minority approach. 
However, apart from Senegal and the Central African Republic, 
where Wolof and Sango, respectively, are fast becoming prestige 
languages, the rest of the heterogeneous countries are handicapped 
by having neither an indigenous prestige language nor a national 
lingua franca. 
It is not clear if a non-prestigious minority indigenous 
language could be successfully elevated to national status. This 
has not been tried elsewhere, but it seems to be a course worthy 
of investigation. Attitudes towards the chosen language could be 
changed through vigorous promotion campaigns; 11 the participatory 
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function could be cultivated for the language by making it a 
requirement in education, and for entry into certain professions, 
Moreover, the collaboration of the various ethnic groups within 
a given country in the codification and elaboration of an 
unstandardized or inadequately standardized language may, of 
itself, foster a feeling of unity. 
5, Conclusion 
The vast majority of African countries have not taken policy 
decisions regarding the status and desired functions of the various 
language varieties existing within their boundaries. As a result, 
this paper has concentrated on initial language planning, as 
represented in policy formulation. Based on the requirements of 
a functional theory of language planning, a policy of "exendo-
glossism" is envisaged for Sub-Saharan Africa. The exact form 
this basic model would take in any given country would depend on 
many factors, such as societal structure, attitudes, and the 
degree of integration desired. 
Finally, language planning has been envisaged at the national 
level, in recognition of the self-perpetuating nature of existing 
boundaries, no matter how arbitrary. The suppression by African 
countries of all attempts at secession, and the failure of the 
East African, Senegambia and Mali federations, all point to this. 
All the same, the approach adopted here would still be useful if 
conditions ever become favorable for political and language planning 
at the pan-African level. The rise of national languages would, 
it is believed, facilitate the choice of pan-African languages by, 
at least, limiting the number of candidate languages. 
Footnotes 
*This paper has benefited from numerous-discussions with 
Paul Garvin. I wish to express my gratitude to him, and to 
Mervyn Alleyne and Wolfgang Wolck for many stimulating ideas, 
but the author retains full responsibility for the final form 
of the views expressed in the paper.
1"National11 as used in this paper does not refer to ethnic 
nationalities as used in connection with Europe. "Nation" is 
here used in the same sense as in the United Nations Charter to 
refer to independent, self-governing countries, some of which are 
composed of several states and/or nationalities. 
2In many European countries the "national" and "official" 
language coincide, but in Africa it is necessary to draw a 
distinction between the two. A language is official if it is 
used for legislative and administrative purposes, i.e., if it 
is recognized in some way by a central or regional government. 
A national language, while it may also be used for legislative 
and administrative purposes, symbolizes the unity and identity 
of the nation, and is by definition an indigenous language. See 
Garvin (1973) for more discussion. 
3The "unifying", "separatist", and "participatory" functions 
are adapted from Garvin (1973),
4The term "primordial" is used after Geertz (1963},
5See Kloss (1968) for an explanation of the terms "exoglossic" 
and "endoglossic".
6It is here assumed that the language variety spoken in 
Scotland is a dialect of English. However, it could quite possibly 
be considered to be a separate language, in which case it could 
serve the separatist function. It should also be noted that even 
a dialect could serve this f'unction if separatist tendencies are 
stron' enough. 
The term "intellectualization" is roughly the Prague School 
equivalent of "modernization". See Garvin (1959} for further 
details,
8It should be noted that there are two dimensions of parti-
cipation--world-wide and national. One of the aims of language 
engineering is the cultivation of the participatory f'unction 
(through modernization and promotion) for any chosen endoglossic 
national language.
9See Rabushka and Shepsle (1972} for further discussion on 
political structures. 
1°For an example of an attitude survey see the paper by 
Wolfgang Wolck in Shuy and Fasold (1973),
11Although television and other modern communication media 
are not yet common in Africa, vigorous promotion is still possible, 
especially at the village level through, say, youth mobilization 
and adult education programs. 
References 
Alexandre, Pierre. 1968. Some linguistic problems of nation-
building in Negro Africa. In J. Fishman, C. Ferguson, 
and J. Das Gupta (eds.}, 119-127, 
Ansre, Gilbert. 1971, Language standardization in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In Sebeok (ed.}, Current Trends in Linguistics 
Vol. 7:680-98. The Hague: Mouton. 
Armstrong, Robert. 1968. Language policies and language 
practices in West Africa. In Fishman, et al. (eds.}, 227-236. 
CCTA/CSA. 1962. Symposiwn on MuZtiZinguaZism. Second Meeting 
of the Inter-African Committee on Linguistics, Brazzaville. 
London: CCTA/CSA Publications Bureau, Publication 87. 
Deutsch, K., and W. Foltz (eds.} 1963. Nation-BuiZding. New 
York: Athernon Press. 
Deutsch, K. W. 1966. NationaZism and SociaZ Communication. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
1970. The trend of European nationalism--the language 
aspect. In J. Fishman (ed.}, Readings in the Sociology of 
Language, 598-606. The Hague: Mouton. 
Ferguson, Charles. 1962. The language factor in national develop-
ment. Anthropological Linguistics 4.1:23-27, 
-----
48 
Ferguson, Charles. 1968. Language development. In Fishman, et 
al. (eds.), 27-35. 
Fishman, Joshua, C. Ferguson, and J. Das Gupta, (eds.). 1968. 
Language Pl'oblems of Developing Nations. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Fishman, Joshua, Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Bjorn Jernudd, Joan 
Rubin. 1971. Research outline for comparative studies of 
language planning. In J, Rubin and B. Jernudd (eds.), 
Can Language Be Planned?, 293-305, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press. 
Fishman, Joshua. 1974. Language planning and language planning 
research: the state of the art. In J. Fishman (ed.), 
Advances in Language Planning, 13-33. The Hague: Mouton. 
Garvin, Paul. 1959. The standard language problem--concepts 
and methods. Anthropological Linguistics 1.3:28-31 . 
. 1973, Some comments on language planning. In 
J. Rubin and R. Shuy (eds.), Language Planning: Current 
Issues and Research, 24-33. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press. 
Geertz, Clifford. 1963. The integrative revolution: Primordial 
sentiments and civil policies in the New States. In C. 
Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States: The Quest for 
Modernity in Asia and Africa, 105-147. New York: Free Press 
of Glencoe. 
Gorman, T. P. 1973, Language allocation and language planning 
in a developing nation. In J. Rubin and R. Shuy (eds.), 
Language Planning: Current Issues and Research, 72-82. 
Washington, D.C,: Georgetown University Press. 
Harries, . Lyndon. 1968. Swahili in Modern East Africa. In 
J. Fishman, et al. (eds.), 415-429. 
Haugen, Einar. 1966. Linguistics and language planning. In W. 
Bright (ed.), Sociolinguistics, 50-71, The Hague: Mouton. 
Jakobson, Roman. 1970, The beginning of national self-deter-
mination in Europe. In J. Fishman (ed.), Readings in the 
Sociology of Language, 585-597, The Hague: Mouton. 
Jernudd, 	B. and J. Das Gupta. 1971, Towards a theory of language 
planning. In J. Rubin and B. Jernudd (eds.), Can Language 
Be Planned?, 195-215, Honolulu: The University Press of 
Hawaii. 
Karam, Francis. 1974, Toward a definition of language planning. 
In J. Fishman (ed), Advances in Language Planning, 101-124. 
The Hague: Mouton. 
Kloss, Heinz. 1968. Notes concerning a language--nation 
typology. In Fishman, et al. (eds.), 69-85, 
Knappert, J. 1965. Language problems of the New Nations of 
Africa. Africa Quarterly 5:95-105. 
Mohmed, Aliyu. 1972, The search for a lingua franca and standards 
in Nigerian education. Work in Pl'ogress 1:96-112. Zaria: 
English Dept. , Ahmadu Bello University. 
Neustupuny, J. V. 1974. Basic types of treatment of language 
problems. In J. Fishman (ed.), Advances in Language Planning, 
37-48. The Hague: Mouton. 
49 
Rabushka, A., and K. Shepsle. 1972. Politics in Plural Societies. 
Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Pub. Co. 
Roberts, Janet. 1962. Sociocultural change and communication 
problems. In Frank Rice (ed.), Study of the Role of Second 
Languages 105-123. Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied 
Linguistics. 
Rubin, Joan. 1971. Evaluation and language planning. In J. 
Rubin and B. Jernudd (eds.), Can Language Be Planned?, 
217-252. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii. 
Rustow, Dankwart. 1968. Language, modernization, and nationhood--
an attempt at typology. In J. Fishman, et al. (eds.), 87-105. 
Samarin, W. J. 1962. Lingua francas, with special reference to 
Africa. In F. Rice (ed.), Study of the Role of Second 
Languages, 54-64. Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied 
Linguistics. 
Shuy, R., and R. Fasold. · 1973. Language Attitudes: Current 
Trends and Prospects.Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press. 
Simon, Walter. 1969. Multilingualism, a comparative study. In 
N. Anderson (ed.), Studies in Multilingualism, 11-25. 
Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
Spencer, John. 1971. West Africa and the English language. In 
J. Spencer (ed.), The English Language in West Africa, 1-34. 
London: Longman. 
Sutherlin, Ruth. 1962. Language situation in East Africa. In F. 
Rice (ed.), Study of the Role of Second Languages, 65-78. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics. 
Tabouret-Keller, A. 1968. Sociological factors of language 
maintenance and language shift: European and African examples. 
In J. Fishman et al. (eds.), 107-118. 
Tucker, A. N. 1971. Orthographic systems and conventions in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In T. Sebeok (ed.), Current Trends in 
Linguistics Vol. 7:618-53. The Hague: Mouton. 
UNESCO. 1951 Cl970J The use of vernacular languages in education. 
Report of the UNESCO Meeting of Specialists, 1951. In J. 
Fishman (ed.), Readings in the Sociology of Language, 688-716. 
The Hague: Mouton. 
Whiteley, 	Wilfred. 1974. Language policies of independent African 
states. In J. Fishman (ed.), Advances in Language Planning, 
177-89. The Hague: Mouton. 
50 
Appendix A: Degree of Multilingualism 
Language of Language · Other Large No. of 
Count!:l Po:eulation Larfiest Grou:el Primacy 
{if diff) 3 
Groups 
(Lanfi};!afies) 
Lanfis . 2 
Botswana 700,000 Tswana-90% Shona 2 
Burundi 3.5 million Tundi-99% Twa 2 
Cameroun 6 million Beti-Pahouin-18% Bamileke, . 50+ 
C.A. Rep. 1.6 million Banda-31% Sango? Baya, Mandjia 35+ 
Chad 4 million Arabic-46% Sara, Maba; ± 20 
Kirdi 
Congo Brazz. 1 million Kongo-52% Teke, Lingala, ± 10 
Monokutuba 
Dahomey 2.7 million Fon-Ewe-60% Bariba, Yoruba ±15 
Ethiopia 25. 5 million Gallinya-50% Amharic Ahmaric, Somali 50+ 
Afar, Tjgrinya 
Gabon 1/2 million Fang-30% Eshira, Banjabi ± 15 
Gambia 360,000 Mandingo Creole, Wolof 3 
Chana 8. 5 million Akan-44% Dagomba, Ewe, 30+ 
Ga 
Guinea 4 million Malinke-48% Fulani, Kpelle ± 20 
Ivory Coast 4.5 million Akan-25% Kru, Mande 50+ 
Kenya 11 million Kikuyu-20% Swahili Luhya, Luo 20+ 
Lesotho 1 million Sotho-95% Zulu, Xhosa 3 
Liberia 1.2 million Mande-44% Kru, Bassa 25+ 
Malawi 4. 5 million Nyanga-46% Lomwe, Yao ±10 
Mali 5 million Bambara-31% Fulani, Senufo ±15 
Mauritania 1.2 million Arabic-Bo% Fulani ±5 
Niger 4 million Hausa-46% Songhai, Fulani 10+ 
Nigeria 60 million Hausa-29% Igbo, Yoruba 100+ 
Rwanda 3.5 million Rwanda-90% Swahili 2 
Senegal 4 million Wolof-37% Fulani ± 10 
Sierra Leone 2.5 million Mende-31% Temne, Vai ± 10 
Somalia 3 million Somali-95% Swahili 3 
Sudan 16 million Arabic-51% Nuba, Darfur 100+ 
Tanzania 13. 3 million Sukuma-12% Swahili Ha 50+ 
Togo 2 million Ewe-44% Kabre ±15 
Uganda 10 million Ganda-20% Swahili? Soga, Nkole, ± 25 
Lango 
Upper Volta 5. 3 million Mossi-50% Dyula, Senufu 20+ 
Zaire 22 million Kongo-30% Swahili, 50+ 
Lingala 
Zambia 4.3 million Bemba-15% Luapula, Lamba ±60 
Notes: 
1 % after a language indicates% of total population for whom it's their 
native variety. 
2In the absence of reliable language surveys, the number of languages are 
merely approximate as indicated by the use of+ and± signs. The data are 
enough, however, to distinguish between heterogeneous and relatively homogeneous 
countries. 
3Language primacy is given for countries where there are indigenous lingua 
francas with more speakers than the language of the largest ethnic group. 
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Appendix A (continued) 
Sources: 
Morrison, D. G., et al. 1972. BZaak Afriaa: A Compa:t'ative Handbook. 
New York: The Free Press. 
Knappers, J. 1965. Language problems of the New Nations of Africa. 
Afriaa QuarterZy 5:95-105. 
52 
Appendix B: Language Policies 
Exoglossic Any Natl. % Pop. for whom 
Count!:1: Lan~age Lg.? 1 Natl. Lg. Native 2 Lingua Franca 
Usage% (if any) 3 
Botswana English Setswana (M) 99% 90% Setswana 
Burundi French Rundi (M) 99% 99% Rundi 
Cameroun French-English Beti-Pahoun(r) 
C. A. Rep. French Sango (S) 25% 5% Sango 
Chad French Arabic-46%, Sara 2B% 
Congo Brazz. French Lingala (r) 
Dahomey French Fon-Ewe 
Ethiopia English Amharic (V) 70% 20% Amharic 
Gabon French Fang 
Ghana English ? 
Guinea French 
Ivory Coast French 
Kenya English Swahili (M) 65% 5% Swahili 
Lesotho English Sotho (M) 98% 95% Sotho 
Liberia English English?? 4% English 
Malawi English Nyanga-60% Pop. 
Mali French Bambera, Arabic 
Mauritania French Arabic (V) 87% Bo% Arabic 
Niger French Hausa 
Nigeria English Hausa (4) 
Rwanda French Rwanda (M) 9B% 90% Rwanda, Swahili 
Senegal French Wolof-60% Pop. 
Sierra Leone English Krio, Mende 
Somalia English/Italian Somali-97% Pop. 
Sudan English Arabic (M) 60% 50% Arabic, Pidgin 
English 
Tanzania English Swahili (V) Bo% 5% Swahili 
Togo French Ewe (S) 50% 44% Ewe, Hausa 
Uganda English Ganda, Swahili 
Upper Volta French Mossi 
Zaire French Lingala, Swahili 
Zambia English English? 
Notes: 
1 (V) and (M) after the names of national languages indicate vigorous or 
moderate implementation policies. (s) indicates that the languages are 
symbolic and are not assigned any significant function in government. (r) 
after the name of a lingua franca means that the language has limited regional 
usage within the whole country. 
2 %in this column (Col. IV) represents% of population for whom the 
national language is their native variety. 
3Percenta.ges are given for lingua francas that are not national languages 
but are used by a sizeable percentage of the population, i.e., lingua francas 
that have a good chance of becoming national languages. 
Source : 
Morrison, D. G., et al. 1972, Black Africa: A Comparo.tive Handbook. New 
York: The Free Press. 
